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Despite the importance of the Treaty on European Union, little attention has been paid to the 
manner in which the negotiations were conducted or to an analysis of particular topics.  This article 
addresses one particular aspect by focusing on Britain’s participation in the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy negotiations.  It emphasises that, notwithstanding London being portrayed as an 
‘awkward’ member of the European Union, it was neither awkward nor isolated in the course of the 
CFSP negotiations.  Moreover, Britain eventually accepted a formula which went further than its 
pre-negotiating position.  An important influence on this outcome was the Fo reign and 
Commonwealth Office’s stranglehold on the dossier.  Conservative MPs were also generally more 
concerned about symbolic issues, including Economic and Monetary Union, the Social Chapter 
and the proposed federal goal.  Greater freedom was therefore possible for negotiators within the 





The December 1991 Maastricht European Council1 marked the end of the 1990-91 
Intergovernmental Conferences on European Political Union and Economic and 
Monetary Union, and the beginning of a lengthy process of ratification.  These events 
have encouraged broad analysis of the Treaty on European Union itself and the role 
played by Member States in its negotiation.2  Yet, despite the significance of the talks, 
little scholarly attention has been paid to analysing individual aspects of the negotiations.  
This is true both of what proved to be key subjects such as monetary union and social 
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policy, and of less visible issues such as the reform of the European Parliament and 
creation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).  This article addresses one 
aspect of this oversight by analysing Britain’s participation in the CFSP negotiations.  A 
flexible stance within this dossier contrasted the government’s negative position on social 
policy and monetary union, where negotiating tactics were dominated by domestic 
political concerns.3  That these pressures were less evident on CFSP owed much to the 
Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, a long-standing Europhile, whose influence on foreign 
and defence policy was not constrained by the Prime Minister, John Major, or the wider 
Cabinet and Parliamentary Party.4  This reflected Hurd’s strength within Cabinet, with 
the authority of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) increasing after Major’s 
appointment as Prime Minister.5  Also, Conservative MPs were more concerned about 
contentious issues such as monetary union, social policy and the federal goal.6 
 
The Talks Begin 
Just as the changed environment caused by the ending of the Cold War and the collapse 
of the system of Soviet satellites in 1989-90 helped provide an impetus to further 
European integration and the development of a European foreign and security policy, so 
external determinants continued to exercise an influence on policy debates after the IGC 
negotiations began.  This was most markedly evidenced by the Gulf War, the emerging 
Yugoslav crisis and the prospect of future European Community (EC) enlargement.7  
These developments, and the fact that Member States directed their attention towards 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and institutional debates, meant that the CFSP 
discussions were overshadowed in the early phase of the IGC, thereby limiting progress.  
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This was true both for the negotiations under the auspices of the IGC on political union 
and those within the parameters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).  
The latter was more concerned with defence than foreign policy questions.8  A further 
external influence was the United States.  Any changes to European security structures, 
and the pre-established dominance of NATO, clearly impinged on the most important 
member.  The US was particularly concerned that a reduction in Europe’s dependence 
upon it would undermine the rationale for its involvement in the Alliance, and thus 
accelerate the erosion of domestic support for basing American troops in Europe - a 
view starkly expressed in the 20 February 1991 ‘Bartholomew memorandum’.9 
In addition to such external determinants, the CFSP negotiations were characterised 
by the dominance exerted by France, Germany and Britain.  This was primarily the 
product of both geopolitical and strategic considerations.  Any attempt to create a 
European defence force hung on the participation of Paris and London, the only 
Member States with both the necessary quantity and quality of military resources.  This 
accordingly gave them greater negotiating leverage.  By contrast, Bonn’s central status 
was characterised by both its geographic and historic significance to European security.  
The predominance of key Member States was also symptomatic of the diplomatic 
dynamics of IGC negotiations: Article 236 of the Treaty noted that ‘common accord’ 
among Member States was necessary for determining ‘the amendments to be made to 
this Treaty’.  Thus, Community institutions did not play a significant role.  The European 
Parliament was only peripherally involved, taking no part in the weekly negotiations at 
official level, and while the Commission was permitted to take part in these talks, its 
representatives only attended infrequently.10  Jacques Delors, the President of the 
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Commission, seemingly did not want Commission proposals to be constrained by the 
formalities of the IGC negotiating group, where texts could be modified by Member 
States.  This pursuit of independence, however, diluted the Commission’s influence on 
EPU.  When it did put forward a text in the external relations field, it was not acceptable 
to anybody, even federalist minded states such as Belgium.11 
Once the negotiations were underway, the Member States basically divided into two 
groups: those wanting the Europeans to be able to act alone in security operations, if 
necessary on a large scale, and those who favoured a more minimalist line, working 
closely with the US and NATO.  These groups divided in turn into two further alliances: 
those who considered that security co-operation should remain intergovernmental, and 
those who believed a future European security policy should be integrated into the main 
EC Treaty and subject to qualified majority voting (QMV) (see Table 1). Predictably, 
London was in the vanguard of those who insisted that decision-taking should be done 
by intergovernmental means and that NATO should continue to be the cornerstone of 
European Security.12  Britain was the strongest advocate of a key US role, but this 
position was shared by several smaller Member States including Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Portugal.  For London, the need for US support was not just based on 
historic sentiment for the Anglo-American special relationship, but also by the harsh 
reality of the Gulf War,13 which indicated that an integrated, separate, European security 
and defence identity was unlikely to emerge,14 especially as any concept of unity 
diminished once it became evident sanctions and diplomatic initiatives would not solve 
the crisis.15  A product of the lack of cohesion in the Community was that Britain was 
one of the few European countries to send a large force to the region,16 which 
Contemporary British History, Vol.12, No.4, Winter 1998. 
 5 
consequently helped to breathe new life into the Anglo-American special relationship.17  
The Gulf War therefore reinforced ‘...the majority of those in British government who 
felt that there was no need to play around with NATO and establish a separate 
European defence policy’.18 
 
Table 1: 
Member States’ Positions on Foreign and Security Policy 
 
 Integrationist Intergovernmental 
 Belgium,  Greece, Luxembourg, 
Spain, Commission, 
 
 European Parliament  
Europeanist Germany* France 
 Italy*  
   
   
 Netherlands Denmark , Portugal, Britain 
Atlanticist  Ireland* 




Note: Germany wanted an independent European foreign and defence policy, but acknowledged 
NATO’s merits.  Italy was guarded about the benefits of a European foreign po licy which replaced 
or reduced NATO’s role. While Ireland was not a member of NATO due to its position of neutrality, 
it was against an independent European force, and favoured NATO protection. 
 
This preference by London for an Atlanticist defence identity was demonstrated in 
two unpublished texts in December 1990 and February 1991.19  They stressed that any 
strengthening of Europe’s defence should take place within the NATO framework20 and 
emphasised that the Western European Union (WEU) should be used for co-ordinating 
operations outside the NATO area, while at the same time transforming it into a link 
between NATO and the future EU (although not forming part of the Union).21  This 
represented a further development for an alliance formed in 1954 which had played a 
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marginal role in the provision of European security throughout the Cold War.  Its status 
as a subordinate relation to NATO was still evident at the time of the IGC, despite 
having undergone a reactivation in 1987 when it co-ordinated the efforts of European 
Member States in the protection of oil shipping lanes in the Gulf.  British advocacy of the 
WEU22 was a departure from the line adopted by Margaret Thatcher, who had refused 
to advocate it as a potential vehicle for the provision of European Security, and 
represented the new government’s desire to be involved in Community policy-making, 
signifying a more constructive and less awkward engagement.  Nevertheless, the new 
British position was not shared by France and Germany, who advocated, in memoranda 
of December 1990 and February 1991, the full creation of a European pillar within 
NATO.23  The latter document stressed that the European Council should be 
responsible for deciding which areas of security policy would be classified as common 
policy,24 and advocated the development of an ‘organic’ relationship between the WEU 
and EPU.25  It therefore contrasted with London’s preference for a simple ‘linkage’ 
between the European Council and WEU.26 
 
The Institutional Debate 
In the wake of such early broadsides, Member States’ attention became increasingly 
focused on other topics, including institutional questions, which were of particular 
relevance to CFSP discussions.27  Here the Commission, European Parliament and 
certain countries such as Belgium, Germany and Greece, favoured the integration of 
CFSP into the Treaty as an individual chapter with its own decision-making principles, 
resulting in it becoming one of the main branches in the tree-like structure which they 
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intended the future EU to have.  The Netherlands too shared this desire, despite 
defending the importance of NATO.  By contrast, the ‘Greek temple’ configuration 
envisaged three pillars, of which CFSP  would be one, the others being, first, continued 
supranational co-operation in the central Community institutions, and second, a new 
area of co-operation, Justice and Home Affairs (JHA).  London favoured the latter 
model because CFSP co-operation (like JHA) would remain intergovernmental with no 
interference from the Commission, Parliament or Court of Justice.  Denmark and 
Portugal shared a similar view,28 and this structure was embodied in the Luxembourg 
Presidency’s first draft treaty of 12 April 1991.29  It did not, however, resolve all issues, 
such as the question of the defence dimension, the Commission’s role and the use of 
QMV.30  For example, the desire by Belgium, France, Germany and Italy for joint 
actions to be decided by QMV31 was opposed by Denmark, Ireland, Portugal and 
Britain.32  Such differences continued to haunt the negotiations, although by the time of 
the June Luxembourg European Council33 the majority of Member States accepted the 
institutional design embodied by the pillar structure.34 
The limited progress made on CFSP within the first six months of the negotiations 
pleased London, as did the pillared arrangement agreed at the June Council.  In 
addition, discussions inside NATO resulted in a May agreement on force structure 
whereby London obtained permanent command of the new Alliance Rapid Reaction 
Corps.  But although this was rightly perceived as a major British success which, in 
conjunction with the pillar structure, could be presented as a victory in the face of more 
federalist desires, the commencement of the Netherlands Presidency of the Council of 
Ministers, in July, spelt both opportunity and frustration for London.  Although the Dutch 
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did not want to see the US estranged from Europe or NATO damaged, they 
nonetheless advocated the incorporation of foreign and security issues within the 
Community framework.35  The former position reflected British interests but the latter 
one contradicted them.  It is an indication of the complexity of the talks that, just as The 
Hague and London agreed on the importance of NATO and disagreed on the 
institutional dynamics, so Paris and London disagreed on the importance of NATO but 
agreed that policy should be determined on an intergovernmental basis. 
That the Dutch Presidency would challenge the pillared structure was not 
immediately apparent to either Britain or other Member States.  This was the result of 
the natural cessation of Community activities in the holiday month of August and the 
general acceptance that the negotiations would follow the route charted by the earlier 
Luxembourg Presidency.  Such expectations proved foolhardy when the Dutch 
advanced their draft Treaty on 24 September 1991.  Abandoning the Luxembourg pillar 
formula with a unitary structure,36 it gave more concrete form to common action and co-
operation on CFSP.37  This approach, which had been outlined in an earlier text on 13 
September,38 was criticised by many Member States at an officials meeting on 26 
September, particularly France and Britain.39  It was therefore inevitable that it would 
fail at the 30 September Brussels General Affairs Council,40 with Belgium the sole 
supporter.41  Agreement was consequently reached that the Luxembourg draft would 
form the basis of future negotiations,42 but another revision of the Dutch text was put 
forward, which contained certain communitarian features, including a majority voting 
procedure for foreign policy, in early November to be debated by Foreign Ministers at 
the Noordwijk ‘conclave’ on 12-13 November.  This still fell short of British objectives, 
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Hurd noting that Member States’ ‘vital interests’ ‘...cannot and should not be 
overridden by majority voting’.43  Differences were accordingly not solved at 
Noordwijk,44 after which a sizeable gulf remained between Britain and the more 
integrationist states on the nature of foreign and defence policy, London insisting upon its 
right to both take vital decisions independently and decision taking by unanimous vote.45  
 
A Very British Coup 
In the midst of these arguments, the most striking and public evidence of British 
engagement in the CFSP negotiations had taken place on the eve of the Foreign 
Ministers’ meeting at Haarzuilen on 5-6 October, when London and Rome put forward 
a joint proposal as a basis for Ministerial discussions.46  Anglo-Italian co-operation had 
been set in motion some six months earlier at a lunch meeting in Rome on Easter 
Monday between Hurd and his Italian counterpart, Gianni De Michelis.47 Hurd had 
good personal relations with De Michelis and a particular fondness for Italy, having 
worked as a diplomat in Rome between 1960 and 1963.  These developments were 
indicative of the FCO’s importance to the CFSP negotiations, producing a text which 
stated: 
Political union implies the gradual elaboration and implementation of a common 
foreign and security policy and a stronger European defence identity with the 
longer-term perspective of a common defence policy compatible with the 
common defence policy we already have with our allies in NATO.48 
 
This wording was only agreed after a prolonged debate, particularly with regard to 
the ‘common defence policy’, which proved to be a major and conscious British 
concession.  London did, however, consider it important to stipulate that any future 
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common defence policy should, from the beginning, be defined as needing to be 
compatible with NATO’s common defence policy.  At the same time, other Member 
States’ acceptance that there already existed a common defence policy within NATO 
(and that any future European policy had to be compatible with it) was perceived as a 
valuable concession to Britain prior to Maastricht.49 For De Michelis, the significance of 
the text was that: 
For the first time, the British are accepting the perspective of a common defence 
policy.  This is the decisive phrase in the text, and it represents a historical 
turning point for the United Kingdom.  It signifies that Major’s government has 
decided to move towards European Union.  The main obstacle on the road to 
Maastricht has been lifted.50 
 
Both de Michelis and Hurd were of a high enough standing to enable them to sell the 
agreement to their respective domestic communities.51  The text was accurately 
perceived as an attempt by both countries to steer the negotiations away from the more 
maximalist Franco-German position, while countering any future federalist aspirations in 
this policy arena.52  The London-Rome axis was therefore mutually beneficial.  For 
instance, although London considered the February Franco-German proposal on 
security and defence to be a dangerous and flawed document (on both transatlantic 
relations and the linkage between NATO and the WEU), there existed an awareness 
within Whitehall that a sole British text would be unlikely to stop the Franco-German 
juggernaut.  In this context, a partnership with a federalist Member State was a means of 
adding weight to Britain’s concept of a European defence identity that would be firmly 
attached to NATO.  This represented traditional British European diplomacy whereby 
alliances were sought on individual topics, rather than a significant new venture for 
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policy-makers.  It consequently did not mean that London regarded Rome as a suitable 
ally for other negotiating points. 
The Anglo-Italian proposal demonstrated a spirit of British engagement with the 
government prepared to compromise so as to obtain influence within the negotiations.  
Flexibility was, however, heavily influenced by the lack of backbench scrutiny inside of 
Westminster.53  This contrasted with EMU, where MPs tended to be aware of the 
government’s negotiating position, a factor influenced by opposition to a single currency 
and desire for an opt-out formula.54 Italy too perceived the text as a means of obtaining 
influence, primarily by ensuring that it was not overshadowed by the Franco-German 
partnership.  (Some Member States considered it had ‘broken ranks’ and aligned with 
Britain55).  At the same time the text provided Rome with an ability to play the role of 
power broker between the competing European and Atlanticist visions.56  The 
proposal’s very importance was emphasised by Delors view that it represented ‘a step 
towards a compromise’.57  Its effect was to therefore counter the Franco-German axis 
in the short term and tilt the negotiations away from the maximalist position. 
Any euphoria in London was threatened on 11 October, when France and Germany 
proposed the creation of a European corps as part of an EC-wide defence 
organisation.58  Differing from the Anglo-Italian initiative, it recommended an organic link 
between the EC and the WEU.  By advocating a WEU rapid reaction force (whereas 
the former aimed at strengthening NATO), it came as a sudden shock to Britain.59  But 
the setback for London’s preference of a NATO orientated ESDI proved to be short-
lived, as a result of NATO’s new ‘Strategic Concept’ ratified at the November 1991 
Rome Summit.  Endorsing the development of European multinational forces ‘...in the 
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context of an emerging European Defence Identity...’, it equally enhanced Alliance 
cohesion and reinforced the transatlantic partnership.60  Significantly, it reasserted the 
primary role of NATO in the realm of defence: 
The Alliance is the essential forum for consultation among its members and the 
venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence 
commitments of Allies under the Washington Treaty.61  
 
Emerging from the NATO quadripartite group, consisting of Britain, France, 
Germany and the US, the text’s true significance lay in France’s participation, as she had 
originally not taken part in the revision of NATO strategy.62  Although the majority of 
NATO communiqués are normally rubber stamped by Heads of State and Government, 
on this occasion President François Mitterrand was initially not prepared to accept the 
text.63 Indeed, it seemed he might ‘reject the whole damn thing because he had not seen 
the text before the meeting’.64  Mitterrand’s hostility was ‘not because he saw it as a 
serious problem, but because he saw it as symptomatic of the US encroaching on purely 
European institutions’.65  The text’s emphasis on the importance of NATO did 
nevertheless mean that the original Franco-German proposal was no longer a viable 
option and therefore Britain proceeded to the Maastricht European Council with greater 
optimism on the CFSP issue. 
 
The Maastricht European Council 
A combination of the multiplicity of topics covered at Maastricht and the priority given 
to social policy and EMU, led most details of the CFSP settlement to be negotiated by 
Member States’ Political Directors. Agreement was brokered on the second day,66 
policy having been hammered out on the margins.  This was clearly symptomatic of the 
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negotiations as a whole, where the CFSP dossier had been frozen out of the debate for 
months in early 1991.  In broad terms, the outcome was a compromise more favourable 
to the Atlanticist vision of Britain than the integrated approach of France and Germany.  
Member governments were made the dominant actors in the CFSP field,67 with the 
European Council granted the ability to set general guidelines and the Council of Foreign 
Ministers to act as the decision-maker.68  Internationally, CFSP was to be represented 
by the Community Presidency, which would have general responsibility for implementing 
measures under the Council.69  
Of the WEU-related issues, the main problem concerned the declaration dealing 
with membership.  This was partly because Greece made it clear in the days prior to 
Maastricht that it would have difficulty adopting the Council’s conclusions if it continued 
to be excluded from the WEU.70 The problem was solved at the very last stage by the 
concept of WEU full members and observers, only members of both the EC and 
NATO could become full members of the WEU, with other NATO countries (Turkey, 
Norway and Iceland) being permitted Associate membership.71 This created the 
possibility of Greek membership of the WEU and meant that Turkey (with whom it had 
a conflict of views over Cyprus) could not become a WEU member until it was granted 
EC membership (of which Greece was the main opposition).  This concept of 
membership was a concession secured by France and Germany and represented a set-
back for Britain’s approach, whose government did not want to turn non-WEU 
members, such as Turkey and Norway, into second class citizens in defence questions.72  
Significantly, however, the concept of Associate membership was linked to a proposal 
by De Michelis which gave such members ‘the possibility of participating fully in the 
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activities of WEU’,73 a guarantee which was clearly helpful to London.  In contrast, the 
main WEU declaration involved no substantial problems because the November NATO 
Rome Summit had ironed out many differences.74 
 Otherwise, the main question concerned the defence clause of the WEU, with 
Britain being against the creation of a common defence.  To this end, a change was 
made to an earlier Belgian proposal which suggested that ‘the common defence policy 
should in time lead to a genuine common defence’,75 so that the eventual wording noted 
that ‘the common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the 
security of the union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which 
might in time lead to a common defence’.76  This notion of a common defence was 
assisted by the earlier Anglo-Italian declaration, although London managed to secure 
that Union policy would be ‘compatible with the common security and defence policy’77 
established within the NATO framework, which was also a development on the Anglo-
Italian declaration.78  The position of NATO was thus safeguarded and a common 
defence policy put off into the future. 
In terms of operational capability, the Maastricht agreement allowed for the 
establishment of common positions on foreign policy,79 which were designed to ensure 
that co-operation took place between Member States to utilise their combined 
diplomatic influence.80 In pursuing common aims the Treaty provided for joint actions81 
as a means of implementing objectives, with the General Affairs Council deciding the 
matters suitable for joint action.82  Although the Treaty was based upon unanimous 
decision-making, certain implementatory measures within the scope of joint actions 
could be taken by QMV.83 The formula ‘unanimity for substantive decisions, QMV for 
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implementing decisions’ had been pushed at Maastricht by Belgium, France, Germany, 
Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.  Britain objected to the use of QMV, pressing 
for unanimity on all matters, whereas virtually all other Member States wanted the mixed 
procedure.84  The introduction of QMV therefore represented a compromise on the part 
of Britain, although the government was not unduly concerned.  While undesirable, 
London considered it a manageable and small inroad into policy.85  The very limitations 
placed on QMV reflected the desire of many states for national control over foreign and 
defence policy, as emphasised by national action being allowed in areas determined for 
joint action, should ‘imperative need’ require (although the Council was to be 
immediately informed of the necessity for such action).86 
Yet, whatever the current limits, the development of common positions and joint 
actions suggested Member States would in due course progress from the codification of 
a common security policy to ‘the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which 
might in time lead to a common defence’.87  In that respect the WEU was central to the 
process of establishing a common defence policy.  The TEU noted it would be an 
‘integral part of the development of the European Union’, though integral did not imply 
an intimate, interlocked relationship.  The Council could only ‘request’ the WEU to 
transmit the defence ramifications of decisions taken by the EC88; it could not instruct the 
WEU to carry out EC defence decisions.  The WEU was thus separated from the EC, 
though WEU members affirmed  their preparedness, ‘at the request of the European 
Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have 
defence implications’.89  Linkage between the EC, WEU and NATO was underlined by 
the declaration that the ‘WEU will be developed as the defence component of the 
Contemporary British History, Vol.12, No.4, Winter 1998. 
 16 
European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic 
Alliance’.90  The dual-sided role of the WEU was further emphasised through the 
objective ‘...to build up WEU in stages as the defence component of the European 
Union’,91 while ‘WEU Member States will intensify co-ordination on Alliance 
issues...with the aim of introducing joint positions...into the process of consultation in the 
Alliance’ and that ‘the Alliance...will remain the essential forum for consultation among 
its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence 
commitments of the Allies under the North Atlantic Treaty’.92 
 
Conclusion 
During the CFSP negotiations Member States grappled with two basic type of texts.  
While some - such as Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg - advocated giving the Union 
a defence role with QMV decision-making, opposition to this was voiced by the Britain, 
Denmark and Portugal.  Some degree of compromise was therefore vital and was 
primarily achieved through negotiations at official level among the leading Member 
States in the Community.  London’s position was principally influenced by the FCO’s 
experience of Community affairs and Hurd’s Europhile outlook.  The negotiations 
demonstrated that Britain was not an isolated partner, as it shared objectives with 
Denmark, Portugal and to some extent the Netherlands, while the Anglo-Italian 
declaration was of crucial importance.  In pursuing its aims of a CFSP built around 
intergovernmental co-operation and a WEU which safeguarded NATO’s role, the 
government was not harassed by backbench opinion.  There was very little concern 
within the Conservative Party about the direction of the debate,93 and the Prime Minister 
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managed the interface between domestic political opinion and the CFSP negotiations 
effectively.  One of the reasons for this was MPs general preoccupation with other IGC 
issues which they considered to be of greater importance, including social policy and 
EMU. 
The influence of the British government was based on its intrinsic importance to 
CFSP: any agreement without Britain would have been virtually worthless.  For London, 
the negotiations largely represented a success because the institutional distinction was 
maintained through the pillared structure and the special relationship between Western 
Europe and North America remained a key element of the European identity.  Britain 
obtained agreement that the WEU would take account of NATO’s decisions as well as 
those of the CFSP, and even WEU decisions on issues outside the NATO area would 
be taken in close co-operation with other Allies.  In comparison, many of the key points 
of the Franco-German texts were not adopted.  These included the creation of a 
European security and defence academy, the immediate establishment of a common 
defence policy and the setting of a timetable for a common defence.  But some issues 
were left unresolved and the possibility was left open for a review of CFSP (and the 
whole Maastricht Treaty) in future.94 This prospect appeased France which had been 
unhappy at the 1991 outcome.  As with so many issues in Europe, Britain had won a 
strategic battle in the CFSP debate, therefore, but it had not won the war.  Yet this point 
was largely lost on British ministers who tended not to see the long-term implications of 
the agreement, which itself represented a significant retreat from London’s pre-IGC 
position. 
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